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This won’t hurt a bit: the Commission’s approach to services of general 
economic interest and state aid to hospitals 
 
 
Abstract:  where the provision of healthcare services involves undertakings (entities 
engaged in the provision of goods and/or services on a market) these are subject to the 
EU state aid rules. State aid questions are raised n particular regarding the 
compensation for public service provision, which may qualify for exemption as 
services of general economic interest (SGEI). In the Altmark Case of 2003 the Court 
of Justice provided criteria for establishing whether aid is in fact involved or not. 
Where aid exists, this may still be declared compatible with the internal market by the 
European Commission based on a further set of SGEI criteria that it spelled out in its 
legislative packages of 2005 and recently in 2011. This paper first looks at the 
relevant tests in general and then focuses on the main substantive Commission state 
aid decision with regard to hospital care, involving the public hospitals in the Brussels 
capital region in 2009. This shows that the Commission leaves considerable leeway 
for the compensation of public service provision by hospitals. However a more formal 
approach by the Member States clarifying the scope f their SGEI would help in 
securing the safe harbour for these services that is provided by the 2011 framework. 
 
JEL codes: I1, I19; K21, K23, K32 
 
Key words: EU law, state aid, services of general economic interest, public service 
obligations, public service compensation, hospital financing 
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This won’t hurt a bit: the Commission’s approach to services of general 
economic interest and state aid to hospitals 
 
Leigh Hancher and Wolf Sauter∗ 
 
1. Introduction 
The hospital sector in the European Union is organised on various lines, both in terms 
of public and private provision and in terms of thedegree of solidarity or competition 
in respect of the sector’s regulation. Hospitals can be large or small and the former are 
not only providers of intra and extra mural care but are also major employers and 
major purchasers of often complex and expensive goods and services. As with most 
social services in Europe, the provision of hospital services is primarily a matter of 
national competence1, subject to the Treaty rules on free movement and competition, 
including the state aid rules.2  
 
The provision of medical services and the acquisition of and subsequent use of 
complex medical devices and equipment are market activities that can have important 
spill over effects on upstream and downstream markets. It therefore follows that 
national funding for the hospital sector, although critical for social welfare, can also 
have important competition implications. This makes the practice of  “deficit 
funding” – that is ex post compensation for shortfalls in hospital budgets - a 
particularly sensitive issue.3 The application of the EU state aid regime to thisype of 
ex post funding is the focus of this chapter.  
 
Following the codification of the so-called compensation approach that was pioneered 
in the 2003 Altmark case,4 hospital financing has been recognised as an explicit 
candidate for a services of general economic interes  (SGEI) exemption based on 
Article 106(2) TFEU, both under the original 2005 SGEI Package and again under the 
recently adopted second SGEI Package of 2011. In this chapter we will outline both 
SGEI regimes for hospital services in general terms before discussing one of the few 
Commission state aid rulings on the merits in this field: the Commission’s 2009 IRIS-
H Decision concerning hospitals in the Brussels region.5 Because this decision is so 
far available only in French and in Dutch we believe a more detailed discussion in 
English may be useful for a broader audience. 
 
The three main questions that we will address here are: 
                                                
∗ Both authors are affiliated with the Tilburg Centre for Law and Economics (TILEC) at Tilburg 
University. In addition Leigh Hancher works for Allen & Overy and Wolf Sauter for the Dutch 
Healthcare Authority. The views expressed here are pe sonal. 
1 Article 168 TFEU. 
2 See also L Hancher and W Sauter, EU law and healthcare: the internal market and competition rules 
(Oxford, OUP 2012); W Sauter and J van de Gronden, “State aid, services of general economic interest 
and universal service in healthcare” (2011) European Competition Law Review 615. 
3 See also C Koenig and J Paul, “State Aid Screening of Hosptial Funding – the German Case” (2010) 
EStAL 755. 
4 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v 
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, and Oberbundesanwalt beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht 
(Altmark) [2003] ECR I-7747. 
5 European Commission, Decision of 28 October 2009, State aid measure NN 54/2009 (ex 
CP244/2005) – Belgium. Financing of public hospitals of the IRIS-network of the Brussels capital 
region. (Available in Dutch and in French only.) 
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• What is the SGEI regime for hospital services and how as it changed between 
the first and second Altmark packages, if at all? 
• How strictly does the Commission apply the Altmark criteria and those of the 
SGEI Package (block exemption Decision) to hospital services in practice? 
• What lessons can be learned for national authorities assigning or entrusting 
SGEI concerning hospital services? 
 
Our conclusion will briefly summarise our findings on these points. 
 
2. The 2005 Altmark Package Decision 
As is extensively discussed elsewhere in this volume the Commission adopted its first 
Altmark Package, consisting of a Decision, a Framework Communication, and an 
amendment and codification of the Directive on financi l transparency in 2005.6 The 
2005 Decision contained a block exemption both for specific types of services 
without any restrictions on the amount of aid or on their turnover – including hospital 
services – as well as for all services provided by undertakings with an annual turnover 
threshold of less than €100 million and subject to a maximum aid of €30 million. 
Hence we will focus our discussion on the 2005 Decision and we will not deal at 
length with the other aspects of the Altmark Package, which are relevant to different 
types of services. 
 
The Decision first sets out the types of services that may qualify for exemption and 
then details the conditions under which they are exmpted, notably the need for an 
explicit act of entrustment and specification of the parameters for compensation and 
the mechanism for retrieving overcompensation. Servic s that are exempted need not 
be notified to the Commission nor does the otherwise standard stand-still obligation 
apply: aid can thus be awarded immediately and lawfully without further action by the 
Commission. Services that may be exempted but which do not meet the conditions on 
the other hand are subject to notification for an individual exemption decision under 
the Framework, which applies substantively largely identical conditions. 
 
Article 2(1)b of the 2005 Decision covered “public service compensation granted to 
hospitals (…) carrying out activities qualified as services of general economic interest 
by the Member State concerned.” The nature of the activities concerned is left to the 
Member States. Recital 16 stated as follows: 
 
Hospitals (…) which are entrusted with tasks involving services of general 
economic interest have specific characteristics that need to be taken into 
consideration. In particular, account should be taken of the fact that at the 
current stage of development of the internal market, th  intensity of distortion 
of competition in those sectors is not necessarily proportionate to the level of 
turnover and compensation. Accordingly, hospitals providing medical care, 
including, where applicable, emergency services and cillary services 
                                                
6 Commission Decision of 28 November 2005 on the application of Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty to 
State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic interest [2005] OJ L312/67; Community framework for State 
aid in the form of public service compensation [2005] OJ C297/4; Commission Directive 2006/111/EC 
of 16 November 2006 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public 
undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain undertakings [2006] OJ L318/17. 
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directly related to the main activities, notably in the field of research (…) 
should benefit from the exemption from notification provided for in this 
Decision, even if the amount of compensation they rceive exceeds the 
thresholds laid down in this Decision, if the services performed are qualified 
as services of general economic interest by the Member States. 
 
It was therefore not sufficient to provide hospital services: in addition it was 
necessary that the services concerned are designated as SGEI. The conditions that 
must be met were, first, that the act or acts concerned must specific (i) the nature 
and the duration of the public service obligations; (ii) the undertaking and territory 
concerned; (iii) the nature of any exclusive or special rights assigned to the 
undertaking; (iv) the parameters for calculating, controlling and reviewing the 
compensation; and (v) the arrangements for avoiding and repaying any 
overcompensation. Second, compensation could not amunt to more than the costs 
of the services concerned and a reasonable profit. A mechanism to control for 
overcompensation with annual checks had to be in place although a maximum of 
10% excess financing could be carried forward to a f llowing year. In addition the 
Decision imposed information (records kept for 10 years) and transparency 
requirements with three-yearly reporting to the Commission. 
 
3. The 2011 SGEI Package Decision 
In December 2011 the Commission comprehensively updated its SGEI Package.7 The 
basic structure with block exemptions in a decision and dealing with individual 
notifications under the Framework was not changed although the aid threshold in the 
2011 Decision is now lowered from €30 million to €15 million. A change in emphasis 
has been that the Decision now targets social services in a much broader sense than 
before, leaving the Framework to deal mainly with the utilities sectors (e.g. energy, 
water and waste disposal services, transport and electronic communications) where 
the Commission expects there is more scope for libealisation and less risk of political 
controversy – at least less than when exposing social services to the state aid and 
competition rules. (As we assume this new Framework is dealt with in various other 
chapters we do not go into detail here nor do we provide a full critical assessment of 
it.)  
 
The new definition of the healthcare services covered in Articles 2(1)b and 2(1)c of 
the 2011 Decision is now much broader: 
 
(b) compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest 
by hospitals providing medical care, including, where applicable, emergency 
services; the pursuit of ancillary activities directly related to the main 
                                                
7 Commission Decision of 20.12.2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to 
certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest [2012] OJ 
L7/3; Communication Commission European Union framework for State aid in the form of public 
service compensation, [2012] OJ C8/15; Communication fr m the Commission on the application of 
the European Union State aid rules to compensation gra ted for the provision of services of general 
economic interest Brussels, [2012] C8/4. A draft Commission Regulation on the application of Articles 
107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to 
undertakings providing services of general economic interest is scheduled for adoption in April 2012, 
[2012] OJ C8/23. 
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activities, notably in the field of research, does not, however, prevent the 
application of this paragraph; 
(c) compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest 
meeting social needs as regards health and long term ca e, childcare, access 
to and reintegration into the labour market, social housing and the care and 
social inclusion of vulnerable groups; 
 
The relevant recital (11) is substantively unchanged although in part the text is now 
incorporated in Article 2(1)b. The most significant extensions are obviously the 
unlimited inclusion of “health and long term care” in Article 2(1)c which sits uneasily 
with the specifications in Article 2(1)b as regards the various types of medical 
services and the status of ancillary activities. Indeed it raises the question whether the 
more general phrasing in Article 2(1)c could not have sufficed. However, it may be 
that the link between health and long term care with social needs is construed as a 
restriction, the scope of which is yet unclear. 
 
The obligations in relation to the act of entrustment, its contents, the parameters for 
compensation based on cost plus reasonable profits, controls on overcompensation are 
the same as under the 2005 regime, except for the addition of a more extensive 
elaboration on how to determine what a reasonable profit entails. This latter is based 
on rate of return on capital that takes into account the degree of risk incurred. The rate 
of return on capital should be defined as the internal ate of return that the undertaking 
obtains on its invested capital over the duration of the period of entrustment based on 
a benchmark of the relevant swap rate plus 100 basis points. 
 
There is so far no experience of the application of the 2011 Decision given that it only 
came into force only on 31 January 2012. Instead we will take a closer look at the 
only substantive SGEI ruling concerning hospital servic s of which we are aware, the 
Commission’s 2009 IRIS-H Decision. 
 
4. Commission Decisions in the Hospital Sector 
The Commission decision of October 2009 concerning the financing of public 
hospitals in the so-called IRIS network of public hospitals in Brussels was 
groundbreaking (the IRIS-H Decision).8 This is because it was and remains the first 
full decision at EU level concerning the application f the state aid rules to the 
hospital sector. The Commission concluded that the Belgian measures were indeed 
state aid. However in so far as these measures cameinto ffect after November 2005, 
they were both exempted from notification and compatible with the internal market 
under Article 108(3) TFEU because they were in accordance with the formal and 
substantive conditions of the 2005 SGEI Decision. Moreover the Commission 
declared those measures which had entered into force before that date and that had not 
been notified to be compatible with the internal market as well, because they met the 
conditions of Article 106(2) TFEU. Both aspects will be discussed in detail further 
below. 
 
 It may be noted that the Commission had however considered a system of capital 
allowances for hospitals in Ireland and found it to be compatible with Article 108(3)c) 
                                                
8 Above note 5. 
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TFEU.9 In general, however, the Commission appears reluctant to be drawn into 
detailed analysis of hospital sector aid. Notably, the Commission has rejected several 
complaints concerning hospital financing in various Member States,10 or it came to 
the conclusion that the measure concerned did not constitute aid (both were the 
subject of appeal to the General Court).11  
 
In the German hospitals case Asklepios Kliniken (2007) a number of private hospitals 
had complained that German public hospitals received state aid by way of regional 
support – mostly in the form of unlimited guarantees.12 The complaint asked the 
Commission in January 2003 to look into the allegedly unlawful conduct on the basis 
of the information which it had provided to the Commission and to take measures to 
suspend the aid until such time as the Commission had taken a final decision. The 
Commission initially refused to take a decision, and ultimately informed the 
complainants that its position on the matter was covered by the then draft Decision of 
2005 on Compensation for SGEIs. The complainants challenged the Commission’s 
approach before the General Court. They argued that the Commission had used an 
unreasonable delay in responding to their complaint, d further that the final position 
taken by the Commission was not a legitimate method of dealing with their 
complaint. 
 
The General Court confirmed that the general rules on legal review provided legal 
standing not just against decisions but against refusals to take a decision as well. 
Nevertheless the General Court dismissed the action, as the adoption by the 
Commission of a decision of general scope setting out abstract criteria for assessing 
the legality of State financing does not by itself constitute a definition of its position 
by the Commission on a complaint concerning that financing. Only the actual 
application of those criteria by the Commission to the situations complained of can 
constitute a definition of position that creates legal standing.13 Finally the Court held 
that the reasonableness of the duration of the investigation of a state aid complaint 
must be determined in relation to the particular circumstances of each case, its 
context, the various procedural stages and the complexity of the case. Uncertainty 
about the (national) legal framework concerned may justify the Commission deferring 
its proceedings pending clarification.14 
 
 In the meantime, the Commission has ruled twice on the financing of health insurers 
in Ireland and once in The Netherlands (in all three cases concerned more specifically 
risk equalisation systems)15 while the General Court has handed down an important 
                                                
9 European Commission, Decision of 27 February 2002, State aid measure N 543/2001 – Ireland. 
Capital allowances for hospitals. 
10 Case T-167/04 Asklepios Kliniken GmbH v Commission [2007] ECR II-2379. 
11 Case T-397/03 Fédération de l’hospitalisation privée, OJ 2006, C22/25. 
12 Case T-167/04 Asklepios Kliniken GmbH v Commission [2007] ECR II-2379. 
13 ibid, paras 77-78. 
14 ibid, para 81. 
15 Decision of the Commission of 13 May 2003 with regard to state aid N 46/2003 – Ireland – risk 
equalisation scheme in the Irish health Insurance market; Decision of the Commission of 3 May 2005 
with regard to state aid N 541/2004 en N 542/2004 – The Netherlands – risk equalisation system and 
retention of reserves; Decision of the Commission of 18 June 2009 with regard to state aid N 582/2008 
(IP/09/961) - Ireland - health insurance intergenerational solidarity relief. 
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ruling concerning the first Irish Decision in the BUPA Case.16 However the case that 
we will discuss here is the first in which the Commission directly tackles the often 
opaque world of hospital financing.  
 
5. The IRIS-H Decision 
The Commission’s approach in the IRIS-H Decision suggests that it opened its 
investigation only reluctantly. Two associations representing private hospitals in 
Brussels first filed a complaint in September 2005. After three years of discussion, the 
Commission effectively rejected the complaint (see b low). The plaintiffs appealed to 
the General Court but in the meantime – and after an informal meeting convened by 
the General Court in July 2009 – the Commission published a comprehensively 
motivated decision in October 2009. (The General Court had meanwhile dismissed 
the appeal by the plaintiffs against the earlier putative decision.17) As a result, after 
four years of proceedings the plaintiffs were left with a first phase state aid decision – 
as the Commission did not think it was necessary to open the second (contentious) 
phase. The plaintiffs have appealed against the Commission decision, and this appeal 





The IRIS-H Decision concerns the five public hospitals in the Brussels capital region 
jointly identified as the IRIS-H (hospitals). From 1996 onward the organisation and 
the operations of these five hospitals including their financing has been elaborated in 
plans that were decided upon by the IRIS framework b dy in which the five hospitals 
cooperate. This IRIS body is subject to public supervision and itself mainly consists 
of communal representatives of the public centres for social security in Brussels 
(which administratively is made up of 20 separate communes) alongside 
representatives of physicians’ organisations and of the two university hospitals in 
Brussels. 
 
The IRIS concept was the result of fundamental restructuring of the financing and 
supervision of hospitals in Belgium dating back to 1995. Briefly summarised, the 
Brussels’ government has decided to balance the budgets of the hospitals concerned 
by means of a €100 million loan extended to the IRIS hospitals via the Brussels’ 
communes. 19 
 
Sources of financing 
The system of public financing for all hospitals in Belgium remains complex, even 
after the abovementioned reforms. During the period c vered by the Commission’s 
                                                
16 Case T-289/03 British United Provident Association Ltd (BUPA) et al v Commission [2008] ECR II-
81. 
17 Joined cases T-128/08 and T-241/08 Coordination bruxelloise d'Institutions sociales et de santé 
(CBI) and Association bruxelloise des institutions des soins de santé privées asbl (ABISP) v 
Commission, OJ 2010, C195/17. 
18 Case T-137/10 Coordination bruxelloise d'Institutions sociales et d  santé (CBI) v Commission, Pub 
2010, C148/38. 
19 As was the case on 31 December 1999, compared to a cumulative deficit of almost €200 million on 
31 December 1995, the year of the abovementioned aid. 
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investigation the Belgian hospitals received six different types of financing for 
carrying out their SGEIs, as formulated at national level (discussed further below).  
 
The relevant sources and volumes of the financing are set out in the Decision,20 i.e.: 
• Sickness- and invalidity insurance payments, which cover only part of hospital 
costs; 
• Full or partial restitution of the compensation paid to hospital doctors (the 
entire amount paid by patients to reimburse the intrventions of medical 
doctors is collected centrally and redistributed); 
• Operating costs through a special budget that is based on reimbursement per 
standard day of care provided. This also covers additional costs for hospitals 
that care for patients who are challenged socially and/or economically; 
• Investment subsidies – intended to cover the building and (interior) 
remodelling of hospitals including investments in medical devices; 
• An indemnity awarded for costs with regard to construction projects or closing 
down hospitals. 
 
The sixth source of financing only relates to public hospitals including the IRIS-H, 
and constitutes additional funding by the Brussels communes that can be used to 
cover the budget deficits of the public hospitals.21 
 
The public service obligations 
Apart from the public service obligation which applies to all hospitals and is set out at 
national level in the Law on Hospitals, the IRIS-H are also subject to a supplementary 
public service obligation that is formulated by the IRIS framework body itself (and 
thereby, by the representatives of the social servic s of the communes who have a 
majority there). This concerns (i) the duty to trea veryone (also for services other 
than emergency services) and (ii) the duty or maintaining a full range of hospital 
services at every location operated by the IRIS-H. 
 
The IRIS-H are also required to fulfil out a number of non-healthcare of ‘social’ 
public service obligations that are carried out by the IRIS framework body. These 
tasks are delegated to the hospitals by the public centres for social security of the 
relevant Brussels’ communes and are financed based on agreements between the 
communes and the IRIS-H that regulate the grant of specific subsidies. 
 
Finally the IRIS-H are under an obligation to ensure that a large proportion of their 
staff is bilingual (as the region of Brussels is both French and Dutch-speaking). This 
obligation is not imposed on the private hospitals in Brussels or any other hospitals in 
Belgium and the annual costs are estimated at €4 million. 
 
The complaint 
The plaintiffs did not contest all six of these subidies – they only contest the subsidy 
for social public service obligations, the subsidy to make up for budget deficits (i.e. 
the sixth source of hospital funding listed above) and the one-off restructuring subsidy 
in 1995. 
 
                                                
20 IRIS-H Decision, above note 5, points 29-48. 
21 Ibid., points 43-48. 
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According to the plaintiffs there are no public service obligations that are specific to 
the IRIS-H. The only such obligations that exist are imposed by the Law on 
Hospitals,22 which apply to all hospitals without distinction regarding their public or 
private status and regarding both emergency care and elective treatment. The 
complaint focuses on the fact that at federal level th  system is the same for public 
and private hospitals whereas at local level only the deficits of public hospitals are 
compensated, whereas at regional level supplementary ad hoc subsidies are also 
exclusively reserved for public hospitals. The plaintiffs assert that the private 
hospitals are consequently forced to reduce their capa ity or may even be forced to 
close down. By contrast studies carried out for the Belgian government show that the 




Because the original complaint dated back to October 2005 – and as according to 
Article 15 of Regulation 659/199924 the competence of the Commission to recover aid 
expires after 10 years – the fact that the original restructuring took place in 1995 is 
significant. The limitation on recovery does not however affect the powers of 
investigation of the Commission, and as such the Decision focuses on the aid granted 
from October 1996 onward, but including the aid that w s granted in the restructuring 
of 1995. 
 
The evaluation by the Commission 
The Commission considered it necessary to investigate all the sources of financing 
that the IRIS-H received by way of public service compensation (i.e. for intramural 
and extramural care and including social services) in view of the requirements set out 
in the Deutsche Post Case,25 where the General Court has ruled that the Commission 
is required to carry out a comprehensive and thorough investigation in order to 
establish whether the total amount of aid by way of compensation of a SGEI was not 
in excess of the net costs of providing the services concerned.  
 
The Commission’s approach was to investigate first whether the funding at issue 
constituted state aid in the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU before addressing the 
defence of the Belgian state that was based on the Al mark Case.26 The Commission 
investigated in turn whether (i) undertakings were involved in (ii) a transfer of state 
resources that (iii) conferred a selective advantage on them (iv) to the detriment of 
trade between the Member States. 
 
The concept of undertaking 
The Belgian authorities adopted the position that te hospitals were not involved in 
economic activities as they were fully based on the solidarity principle. 
                                                
22 Loi sur les hôpitaux coordonnée du 7 août 1987 (coordinated law on hospitals of 7 august 1987), 
Moniteur Belge (Belgian offical journal) 7.10.1987, in force from 17.10.1987. 
23 According to a report by the Belgian Mutualités Chretiennes dicusssed by David Lienard, “Hôpitaux 
privés/Hôpitaux publics: financement, déficits, patien èle sociale” in MC informations 211, February 
2004, p 10 (with statistical annexes) this was the difference between a hospital day in public (€ 258) 
and private hospitals (€ 237) in 2003. 
24 Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the 
application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ 1999, L83/1. 
25 Case T-266/02 Deutsche Post v Commission [2008] ECR II-1233. 
26 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans above note 4. 
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The Commission found that in view of established case l w,27 the economic nature of 
the hospitals’ activities was without doubt. The main ctivities of the IRIS-H, which 
consist of elective and emergency medical care (intramural care), are activities that 
were also carried out by other institutions including private hospitals. This confirms 
that although the solidarity aspect plays a role in the Commission’s assessment it is 
not decisive,28 especially where private hospitals are providing the same type of 
intramural care (even if this is possibly not identical). 
 
In this context it is worth noting that the Commission did not consider it necessary to 
engage in a further analysis of the economic nature of the extramural activities of a 
social nature because it considered that the subsidies involved would qualify as aid 
that was compatible with the internal market.29 
 
State resources 
As the measures concerned and their financing (at federal as well as regional and 
local level) originate with the responsible public authorities the Commission ruled 
that it was not contestable that they could be attributed to the State. 
 
Selectivity 
Regarding intramural care the Commission considered th  measures to be selective 
because only the IRIS-H had been charged with the rel vant public service 
obligations – and also they were the only undertakings receiving compensation for 
these obligations. Other healthcare providers were excluded from this scheme. The 
Commission did not deal with the question whether this was a case of economic 
advantage or, as was claimed by the Belgian authorities based on the Altmark Case,30 
purely a matter of compensation for public service obligations. (This point was dealt 
with separately after the assessment of the other elements of state aid had been 
completed.) 
 
An effect on trade between the Member States 
As regards this point the Commission pointed out that several undertakings are 
present on the market and the position of the undertakings that benefited from the 
contested measures was strengthened so the existence of a negative effect on trade 
could not be excluded. Moreover it pointed out there was some limited cross-border 
provision of services to patients for both intramural and extramural care. 
 
Hence the Commission concluded that the contested financing constituted state aid in 
the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. Next it addressed the application of the Altmark 
criteria. 
 
The Altmark criteria: state aid or compensation? 
The well-known four cumulative Altmark criteria can be summarised as follows: 
                                                
27 Case C-237/04 Enirisorse SpA v Sotacarbo SpA [2006] ECR I-2843; Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner 
and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979; Joined cases C-180/98 tot C-184/9  Pavel 
Pavlov et al. v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten [2000] ECR I-6451. 
28 Case C-244/94 Fédération française des sociétés d'assurances et al. [1995] ECR I-4013. 
29 IRIS-H Decision, above note 5, point 111. This is remarkable because it would appear that market 
entry by means of public procurement would be a private alternative to the IRIS-H network. 
30 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans, above note 4. 
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• being charged with a clearly defined public service obligations 
• objective and transparent parameters for compensation;  
• no overcompensation;  
• compensation based on public procurement procedure or the costs of an 
efficient undertaking  
 
Based on the 2008 BUPA Case the rule is that these Altmark criteria must be applied 
ex tunc,31 i.e. retroactively to the IRIS-H subsidies that were granted before the 
Altmark ruling took place, as the ECJ had chosen not to limit the applicability of its 
Altmark judgment in time. The Commission next tried to simpl fy the analysis by 
considering only two of the four Altmark criteria, and went on: 
• first, to analyse whether the undertakings involved ha  indeed been entrusted 
with an SGEI (the first criterion); 
• and second whether the selection of the undertakings involved had been based 
on the fourth criterion 
 
Entrustment 
The Commission recalled the broad discretion enjoyed by the Member States in this 
sector – as had been confirmed in the BUPA Case:32 the organisation of the healthcare 
sector largely remains the domain of the Member States. The role of the Commission 
is limited to checking for a manifest error of judgment.  
 
As regards intramural care the Commission considered that the EU law requirements 
had been met. The federal system with regard to the SGEI had been well defined in 
the Law on Hospitals and in particular their obligatory and social character was clear. 
Regarding the specific public service obligations of the IRIS-H the Commission 
established that these had been imposed on the basis of a law on social security 
services33 and in the strategic IRIS plans that were set out by he IRIS framework 
body (and “which should be regarded as equivalent to the act of a public authority”). 
The IRIS-H are under the obligation to provide all types of hospital care to everyone 
on demand in a framework in which all types of hospital care must be available at all 
locations. In contrast to the private hospitals which are free to select their patients and 
to organise their activities the IRIS-H do not have ny choice as regards the definition 
an the scope of said obligations.34 This means existence of a public service obligation 
has been established: the territorial limitation of the users/beneficiaries involved does 
not affect this conclusion.35 
 
As regards the non-hospital tasks of the IRIS-H (social care, alongside medical care to 
patients) the obligatory character of these social tasks likewise has a legal basis and 
can also be found in the fact that those charged with these tasks have no room for 
manoeuvre with regard to its definition and scope. In what appears to be circular 
                                                
31 Case T-289/03 BUPA, above note 16 . 
32 Ibid., para 165. 
33 Loi organique des Centres Publics d'Action Sociale du 8 juillet 1976 (Organic law on the public 
centres for social security), Belgian offical journal 5 August 1976. 
34 “The obligatory nature of the service and therefor the existence of a service of general economiuc 
interest are proven if the service providers is obliged to conclude agreements on fixed terms.” IRIS-H 
Decision, para 149. 
35 Case T-289/03 BUPA, above note 16, para 186. 
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reasoning, the social character of these tasks flows from the fact that the additional 
costs that are incurred by the IRIS-H to fulfil these tasks are charged to the public 
authorities in the context of their responsibility for setting social policy. 
 
The first Altmark criterion was therefore met both for intra- and extramural care as 
well as the social services concerned. 
 
Public procurement or efficient undertaking 
The Commission first established for all intramural and extramural SGEIs with which 
the IRIS-H had been entrusted that these had not been attributed on the basis of a 
public procurement procedure (and noted this aspect might become the subject of 
separate proceedings under the enforcement of the public procurement rules).36 In 
addition neither the Belgian State nor the plaintiffs had provided sufficient evidence 
to determine whether the compensation mechanisms for intramural and extramural 
care provided by the IRIS-H actually and fully met the requirement of matching an 
efficient undertaking in the sense of the fourth Altmark criterion: 
 
According to the Commission it is not possible, based on the arguments 
provided by the parties, to establish with absolute certainty whether when 
setting the level of the necessary compensation, the actual costs of an average 
undertaking with the characteristics demanded by the case law were really 
taken into account and whether the IRIS-H and the private hospitals that have 
filed the complaint are actually such representative or average well run 
undertakings as the Altmark Case requires.37 
 
Moreover according to the Commission compensation for providing an SGEI that is 
awarded to several undertakings and that is based on their average costs without 
requiring any evidence of sound management would inevitably lead to 
overcompensation. (NB: at a later stage of the Decision the Commission would adopt 
the opposite point of view – compensation based on average costs can lead to under-
compensation.) Hence the Commission held that the fourth Altmark criterion had not 
been met so that the measures constituted state aid in the sense of Article 107(1) 
TEFU on the basis of the Altmark analysis. This brought the Commission to the third 
and final branch of its analysis: the question whether the contested measures were 
compatible with the internal market based on Article 106(2) TFEU. This required it to 
apply the criteria set out in the 2005 SGEI Package (cast as a specification of the 
general requirements of necessity and proportionality that apply under Article 106(2) 
TFEU). 
 
Services of general economic interest 
Article 106(2) TEFU can only be relied upon if the measure concerned respects the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality as well as the following conditions: 
 
(i) the services in question must be a SGEI that is clearly defined as such by 
the Member State; (ii) the undertaking provided theSGEI must have been 
formally charged with doing so by the Member State; (iii) application of the 
                                                
36 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public 
service contracts, OJ 2004, L134/114. 
37 IRIS-H Decision, above note 5, para 161. 
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competition rules set out in the Treaty must obstruct the fulfilment by the 
undertaking of the special tasks with which it has been charged and an 
exemption from these rules may not affect trade to an extent that this is at odds 
with the Community interest.38 
 
Because of the repetitive nature and the overlap of the criteria deployed as part of the 
various tests at both the procedural and substantive stages in this case (and similar 
cases) it is at times difficult to keep sight of the larger picture. The main substantive 
difference between the SGEI test in Article 106(2) TFEU as elaborated in the 2005 
Decision and the Altmark criteria is that the fourth Altmark criterion (tender or 
efficiency test) is not included in the criteria of the SGEI package. In addition there is 
an important procedural difference: the SGEI package and its more detailed 
substantive assessment criteria that elaborate on Article 106(2) TFEU only applied 
from November (the Framework) respectively December (the Decision) of 2005 
whereas, as mentioned, the Altmark Case applies ex tunc.39 
 
Below we will first address the Commission’s test of necessity and proportionality. 
 
Necessity 
As the General Court had already indicated in the BUPA Case the Member State 
enjoys a broad margin of appreciation not just with regard to the definition of a SGEI 
but also when determining the compensation of the costs involved.40 The authorities 
must however specify the parameters of the compensatio  involved so the 
Commission may determine whether the compensation awarded is in line with what is 
necessary. This is a marginal standard of review: the act of assignment must contain 
the necessary basic elements that enable the future compensation to be calculated. 
However the Member States retain the freedom to set the parameters of their choice.  
 
The first part of the necessity criterion regarding the definition of and the entrustment 
of the SGEI obligations largely covers the same ground as the first Altmark criterion. 
The Commission also pointed out that based on consistent case law the fact that parts 
of the entrustment are found in different legal acts and/or have to be derived from the 
legal context does not raise any doubts as to whether t ese criteria (an act of 
assignment specifying the SGEI etc) are met. This may be in line with recent practice 
but it is perhaps surprising if we look at the listof elements that are set out in the 
SGEI package which must be covered by a ‘clear’ act of assignment.  
 
It is less surprising that the Commission subsequently reaches the conclusion that the 
legal basis for compensation of the IRIS-H by the responsible authorities is clearly set 
out in law and regulation. As regards the compensation of deficits as a result of public 
service obligations that have exclusively been imposed upon public hospitals 
(including the IRIS-H) the Commission notes that the Law on Hospitals clearly sets 
out the criteria for compensation in advance and also sets out specific provisions for 
the compensation of SGEI-related deficits of the public hospitals. This compensation 
                                                
38 Ibid., para 165. 
39 Cf. D. Grespan, Services of General Economic Interest, in W. Mederer, N. Pesaresi, and M. van 
Hoof (eds), EU Competition Law, part IV, State Aid, Book 2, (Claeys en Casteels, Leuven 2008), pp 
1123-1208, at 4.1140ff. 
40 Case T-289/03 BUPA, above note 16, para 214. 
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is not based on actual costs but on the average costs of a group of comparable 
hospitals. 
 
Next the Commission, without any further reference to a significant investigation into 
the costs involved, concludes that this system can le d to under-compensation. 
Consequently the compensation is regarded as necessary and not just in order to 
compensate for the actual costs of carrying out the public service obligations set out 
in the Law on hospitals. The ‘ex post’ compensation of deficits is also considered to 
be necessary from a health perspective and for social reasons in order to guarantee the 
continuity and the viability of the system that in all probability could not function if 
only a limited number of private hospitals were available.41 It is would seem that from 
this perspective there can never be overcompensatio. What makes this observation 
questionable is the fact that earlier in the same decision the same compensation based 
on average costs was interpreted as proof that overc mpensation was possible, and 
hence the fourth Altmark condition was not met. 
 
As regards the social tasks the Commission concluded, based on a succinct analysis, 
that here the cost parameters can likewise be determin d in advance.  
 
Next the Commission tackles the question whether th provisions to prevent and/or 
correct for overcompensation are adequate. As regards the compensation for deficits 
due to public service obligations of the public hospitals awarded by the national 
(federal) government the Commission concludes that this compensation is limited to 
the balance of the net costs of the relevant public services. Hence the compensation 
remains within the limits of the 2005 SGEI package – i.e. 100% of the net costs plus a 
reasonable profit margin. The regional restructuring aid that had been provided by the 
Brussels capital region related to public service obligations that had already been 
fulfilled and in accordance with parameters for compensation that were adequately 
defined. In addition the region only provides temporary credits while awaiting the 
calculation and payment (10 years later…) of the definitive deficit with regard to the 
public service obligations by the federal authorities. Finally the cost for the public 
service obligations and social tasks that are delegated by the public centres for social 
security via the IRIS-Z framework body are not reimbursed automatically but only 
when (unspecified) further demands set by the public centres for social security are 
met, which are designed to avoid overcompensation. 
 
Hence the Commission concluded that these measures are adequate to meet the first 
compatibility criterion in the SGEI package; necessity. 
 
Proportionality  
Here too the Commission cites the BUPA case: 
 
As regards, more particularly, review of the proportionality of the 
compensation for discharging an SGEI mission, as establi hed by an act of 
general application, it has further been specified in the case-law that that 
review is limited to ascertaining whether the compensation provided for is 
necessary in order for the SGEI in question to be capable of being performed 
in economically acceptable conditions (…), or whether, on the other hand, the 
                                                
41 IRIS-H Decision, above note 4, para 177. 
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measure in question is manifestly inappropriate by reference to the objective 
pursued (…).42 
 
The Commission also applies the provisions of the SGEI package and recalls that for 
purposes of substantive compatibility assessment (i contrast to the Altmark 
procedural test) the amount of compensation does not have to be established by means 
of a comparison of the costs of an efficient undertaking. If the state shows that the 
amount of compensation is equal to the projected net costs based on the parameters 
that are clearly defined in the act of assignment there will be no finding of 
overcompensation and the compensation involved will be regarded as compatible aid. 
In other words: the public authorities may compensate the undertaking that has been 
charged with carrying out a SGEI for 100% of the costs involved plus a reasonable 
profit margin, and ignore any consideration of efficiency in respect of how these costs 
are incurred. Based on its investigation of the annu l accounts of the IRIS-H (i.e. the 
results regarding hospital services and social services, excluding non-SGEI activities) 
the Commission reached its conclusion that no overcmpensation was involved. 
 
This point is all the more important to the extent that the test to which the financing is 
subjected is less strict: this means more financial room for manoeuvre is left that 
could be (ab)used for cross subsidies of competitiv services. The Belgian state had 
provided information demonstrating that the EU requirement of separate accounts had 
been met and this provided evidence that the division between the economic and the 
non-economic activities of the hospitals had been rspected. The Commission 
considered this satisfactory. 
  
Hence the measures involved were considered not to be manifestly inappropriate, and 
therefore proportional. 
 
6. Some implications of the IRIS-H Decision  
 
The application of the Altmark criteria 
The Commission appears to use the approach of applying only two of the four 
(cumulative) Altmark criteria more frequently.43 Nevertheless the question arises why 
the Commission has decided not to use the second (clear parameters for 
compensation) and/or the third (no overcompensation) criteria. Apparently this served 
to simplify the analysis. The nature of the complaint may also have been decisive: the 
plaintiffs’ position is that the IRIS-H have not been charged with distinctive public 
service obligations. In addition they are claiming that the way in which the services 
concerned are financed is inefficient. Perhaps the Commission did not wish to tackle 
the same issue twice? In addition the plaintiffs claim that even if the intervention at 
federal level is organised in such a way that it iscompatible with the second Altmark 
criterion, the same does not apply to the for the regional and local levels of 
intervention where the system is intransparent. Because the deficits at local and 
regional level are financed ex post this would mean that the system as a whole does 
not meet the second criterion (otherwise the second and third criteria would become 
                                                
42 Case T-289/03 BUPA, above note 16, para 222. Most likely the General Court only intended to 
juxtapose the necessity and the proportionality test in order to highlight that the latter test is whether 
the means used are manifestly inappropriate. 
43 However the Commission examined all four criteria in its Decision of 17 June 2009, State aid No N 
582/2008 – Ireland. Health Insurance intergeneration l solidarity relief. 
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indistinct – i.e. no overcompensation). Hence the plaintiffs in their appeal claim that 
the Commission has not applied the criteria for evaluating overcompensation properly 
and that transparency is also lacking.  
  
At the same time, the Commission does not follow the approach taken by the General 
Court in the BUPA Case either, where it watered down the Altmark criteria to a 
considerable degree. The approach by the Commission which seems laudable leads to 
the finding of aid in the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU that takes place because the 
fourth Altmark criterion is not met.  
 
The application of Article 106(2) TFEU and the SGEI Package 
The criteria of the 2005 SGEI Package with regard to the act of assignment are 
disregarded by erroneously assuming that these had been met when applying the 
Altmark test. There is no clear legal basis for theadditional services that the 
Commission assumes must be performed exclusively by the public hospitals, while 
the requirement of such a basis does exist. The genral public service obligation at 
national level is moreover not set out in line with the requirements of the SGEI 
package (which may explain why Altmark is relied upon at this point). 
 
In addition there is an important distinction between the application of the Altmark 
criteria and the application of the SGEI Package: Altmark serves to decide whether an 
economic advantage was enjoyed in the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU whereas 
Article 106(2) TFEU is about balancing interests. This means that when carrying out 
the latter test the Commission omits several of the Altmark criteria (especially the 
fourth criterion) on public procurement and efficiency. This is in line with the 2005 
SGEI Package, based on Article 106(2) TFEU and adopte  in line with Article 106(3) 
TEFU. Only the first three Altmark criteria are repeated, with additional tests 
regarding overcompensation. Is this the correct approach?44 
  
The efficiency test is replaced by a test in the 2005 SGEI Package that allows full 
compensation of costs without any considerations of value for money. It is clear that 
this is undesirable from a perspective of competition. The instruments of the 
Commission are thereby limited to checking the financing mechanisms for 
overcompensation (i.e. where more than actual costs incurred plus a reasonable profit) 
and competitors cannot compete for the market based on public procurement. This 
gives the providers of SGEI perverse incentives to run up costs and releases the 
Member States form the obligation of replacing inefficient incumbents and 
controlling costs. It will also not help to lower state aid levels in line with the 2005 
State aid action plan. 45
 
In the IRIS-H Decision the total amount of compensation for SGEI has become a 
crucial component of the balancing of interests when Article 106(2) TFEU is applied 
to establish the compatibility of the aid: the Commission does not consider the 
underlying costs in any detail at all. Nevertheless thi  is the crucial element of this 
Decision which after all is about ex post financing of deficits. Perhaps therefore the 
relevant question is not whether the efficiency criterion has been met but what method 
                                                
44 Case T-289/03 BUPA (above note 16), also assumes overlap. Cf. Case T-8/06 FAB Fernsehen aus 
Berlin GmbH v Commission [2009] ECR II-196, paras 64 and 65-69.  
45 Com 2005 
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is used to ensure that only actual costs are reimbursed. As one of us has argued 
elsewhere however, this is a different test.46 
  
Arguably it is not up to the Commission to develop its own standard of efficiency in 
the hospital sector, and even if it could take a more stringent approach to inputs it is 
highly questionable if it has the power to determine outputs – the quality of service is 
determined by the Member States.47 Nevertheless, it could have taken the costs in the 
private sector as a benchmark in order to determine whether the public hospitals were 
obliged to incur additional expenses in order to be a le to deliver additional services. 
The Commission avoids using this model by claiming that the public and private 
hospitals have different tasks, but it is not clear from its analysis whether this 
distinction is wholly justified. 
 
The plaintiffs moreover rightly point out that Article 106(2) TFEU must, because it is 
an exception, be interpreted restrictively and therefore (arguably, we believe) in line 
with the proportionality test in this provision an efficiency test is required. At a 
minimum the Commission could have addressed this elem nt of the complaint. 
 
Recent developments 
The 2009 Monti report on the internal market48 saw possibilities for establishing 
SGEI at EU level for specific services i.e. bank accounts (current accounts) and 
access to broadband services. It also pleaded in favour of aligning public procurement 
and the rules on SGEI – and as such in favour of applying the fourth Altmark criterion 
more rigorously. A greater emphasis on compliance with the EU public procurement 
regime has been adopted with the 2011 SGEI Package, albeit that in the context of the 
block exemption Decision the Commission recalls that t e procurement principles 
deriving from the Treaty free movement principles should be respected. An important 
innovation of the new framework which applies to aid which would not fall within the 
scope of the exemption Decision, is the requirement for Member States to hold a 
public consultation to establish public service needs.49 
 
State aid to the hospital sector is however unlikely to evaluated under the new 
framework as this will be primarily applicable to aid measures above the Euro 15 
million threshold. As explained, this threshold does not apply to the hospital sector. If 
a measure cannot be brought under the conditions set out in the Decision then it is 
unlikely that it could be declared compatible with e framework, following 
notification, given that the latter imposes similar and indeed stricter conditions for 
assessing the compatibility of the aid. This leaves open the question of whether the 
Commission would nevertheless consider a justificaton based on Article 106(2) 
TFEU, for example where there are perhaps only weak provisions for controlling 
compensation levels ex ante, but where ex post controls can be satisfactorily applied. 
 
                                                
46 Cf. L. Hancher and P. Larouche “Community, state and market”, in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds), 
The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed (Oxford, 2010). 
47 Case T-442/03 SIC - Sociedade Independente de Comunicação, SA v Commission [2008] ECR 1, at 
para 212 
48 A new strategy for the single market: at the service of Europe’s economy and society. Report to the 
President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, by Mario Monti, 9 May 2010 (especially 
point 3.3. Social services and the single market). 
49 Commission Communication, ‘European Union framework f  State aid in the form of public service 
compensation’, C(2011) 9406 final.  
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Finally, in the Communication published along with the new 2011 Decision and 
framework, the Commission considers that contracts for the performance of SGEIs 
should be awarded in compliance with the procurement pri ciples, as well as the EU 
procurement directives in so far as these apply.50 If adequate procedures have not 
been followed, then the aid cannot be deemed compatible. If in its subsequent 
enforcement of the new 2011 Altmark Package, the Commission succeeds in its 
attempt to restrict “gold plating” of public services by the Member States, this may 
indicate that the Commission is prepared to embark on a more economic approach to 
examining the trade off between national public interests on the one hand and 
competition and free movement objectives on the othr.  
 
Procurement 
At the time of writing the Commission has proposed a fundamental revision of the 
procurement regime which would provide an exemption for social services. On the 
same date as the Second Altmark package was adopted, the Commission announced 
its proposed reforms to the EU procurement regime.51 
 
The new proposals can be summarised as follows. 
  
• First, the Commission intends to publish a separate measure for a directive on 
public services concessions – albeit that social service concessions will be 
given special treatment. 
 
• Second, a new “light regime” approach to social servic s, including healthcare 
services will be introduced in the revised procurement Directive. 
 
• Third a new, clearer definition of contracting entity is to be adopted and the 
definition of the term 'bodies governed by public law’ is clarified. 
 
• Fourth, new criteria for the award of contracts will be recognised – so that a 
cost- effectiveness approach is firmly recognised. 
 
• Fifth, the right of contracting authorities to deploy a strategic use of the 
procurement rules, for example, to improve public health will be explicitly 
acknowledged. 
 
• Finally the proposal recommends the establishment of a designated national 
authority to monitor and review observance of procedur s. 
 
If adopted this reform will mean that a new separate procurement regime for social 
services, including health services is to be introduced. The Commission considers that 
social, health and education services have specific characteristics which make them 
inappropriate for the regular procedures for the award of public service contracts. 
These services are considered to be typically provided within a specific context that 
varies widely between Member States due to different administrative organisational 
and cultural circumstances. Therefore, once again the Commission confirms that such 
                                                
50 Above note 7. 
51 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/modernising_rules/reform_proposals_en.htm 
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services have, by their very nature, only a very limited cross-border dimension. 
Member States should have the discretion to organise the choice of service providers.  
 
The proposed Directive provides: 
(i) a higher threshold for social services of EUR 500,000, and  
(ii) that above this threshold, the only procedural ob igations that will apply are the 
so-called procurement principles, that is respect for he basic 'procurement principles' 
of transparency and equal treatment. 
 
 
Finally, it is striking that in the Brussels hospital decision the Commission did not 
carry out a detailed cost/benefit analysis even where this would be possible based on 
national rules. It is worrying that the fact deficits are compensated by definition is 
justified as evidence of the solidarity based character of the tasks involved. If all 
deficits are covered ex post the difference between the second Altmark criterion 
(setting out parameters in advance) and the third Altmark criterion (no 
overcompensation) disappears. But, as the Court held in BUPA, the Member State 
should not fund inefficiencies and to ensure that tis does not occur, this ought to 
require an economic analysis as part of the compatibility assessment. If the 
Commission decision in the IRIS hospitals case is to be deemed the standard 
approach, t this seems to suggest that we are unlikely to see a strict discipline for 
public service obligations in the hospital sector in the near future.52 
 
7. Conclusion 
The exemption regime for healthcare services that constitute SGEIs as part of the 
2011 Decision under the new SGEI Package has been broadened considerably to 
cover not just hospital care but all (curative) healthcare as well as long term care, 
irrespective of the amount of aid or turnover concer ed. As before this exemption 
applies to the notification and standstill requirements but only if the conditions set out 
in the Decision with respect to the act of entrustment, the parameters for 
compensation and the controls of overcompensation are met. These latter conditions 
are equally applicable to all sectors – albeit thate Commission appears to recognize 
the need for some flexibility at national level. 
 
The IRIS-H decision proves a useful illustration of the way the Commission applies 
the rules on state aid and SGEI compensation in practice. The first Altmark case and 
SGEI Package criterion was once again not strictly applied: instead the Commission 
assumed that at least a local level, public service obligations existed and had been 
well defined in the regulatory context. In addition we have seen how, the fourth 
Altmark criterion on efficiency which is applied todetermine whether aid is present 
was trumped by the more relaxed compatibility assessm nt standards set out in the 
2005 SGEI package where no comparable criterion exists: net costs are assumed as 
given, and only the scope for reasonable profits is restrained. 
 
This may well be in line with the way the SGEI Packge (2005 and 2011 versions) 
works, but it results in a system that perpetuates th  existence of perverse incentives 
                                                
52 However see Commission Decision 2006/513/EC of 9 November 2005 on the State Aid which the 
Federal Republic of Germany has implemented for the introduction of digital terrestrial television 
(DVB-T) in Berlin-Brandenburg, OJ 2006, L200/14, confirmed in Case T-8/06 FAB Fernsehen, above 
note 48, paras 63ff.  
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for SGEI incumbents which both frustrate competition in the sector and in all 
likelihood could lead to a suboptimal provision of the SGEI themselves. The 
Commission also missed a golden opportunity to apply an efficiency test where in the 
present case it could have had comparable data for public and private hospitals at its 
disposal which are after all subject to largely comparable regulatory requirements. 
 
All this seems to be largely the result of an overly cautious approach by the 
Commission which considers all but the grossest violations of EU law out of bounds 
to intervention, especially in areas such as healthc re where the EU so far lacks 
extensive involvement (but may have ambitions to become more involved – 
evidence?). One possible way out might be stricter application of the public 
procurement rules in the SGEI context.53 For the time being however both the new 
2011 SGEI Package and state aid practice show that the Commission is content to do 
without a stringent application of the state aid rules based on economic analysis in the 
hospital sector – or indeed in healthcare and long term care at large. 
 
The lesson for the Member States is likely to be that t ey can remain relatively 
relaxed about formal SGEI entrustment of hospital services as the Commission is 
likely to derive public service obligations from the general regulatory context as 
necessary. This is relevant for Member States as itshelters them from making tough 
decisions on access, priorities, and preferential funding. This is regrettable because 
apart from foregoing the salutary effects of Member States making precisely those 
choices explicit, this approach also curtails the possibility for third parties to point out 
discrepancies and contest the coherence and thereby th  validity of formal SGEI 
entrustment – or the lack thereof. In terms of legal certainty and legal protection this 
is a lamentable result, even if it is one the Commission could presumably reverse, by 
bringing its own practice into line with its recent legislation and insisting that Member 
States do the same. The coming into force of the 2011 SGEI Package would be an 
excellent moment to start doing so. 
                                                
53 Cf. Office of Fair Trading (OFT) working paper, Competition in mixed markets: ensuring 
competitive neutrality (July 2010); and J. Fingleton, “Reforming public services”, speech of 7 July 
2010 (both on the OFT website). 
